The 'uranium from Africa' claim
On June 17 2004, Llew Smith MP and I made a joint submission to the Butler Review on the grave doubts about the veracity of the UK Government claim that Iraq 'sought to procure significant quantities of uranium from Africa'. The submission is reproduced below
For the text of an Early Day Motion I tabled on the Iraq Survey Group findings on the 'uranium claim', click here.
For details of our response to the Butler Review's findings on the uranium claim click here.
SUBMISSION TO THE BUTLER REVIEW
LYNNE JONES MP
LLEW SMITH MP
THE CLAIM THAT IRAQ SOUGHT TO PROCURE URANIUM FROM AFRICA
INTELLIGENCE USED BY THE UK GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO THE 2003 COALITION INVASION OF IRAQ
JUNE 2004
CONTENTS
- The Foreign Affairs Select Committee questioning on the CIA’s reservations
- The Intelligence and Security Committee conclusion that it was reasonable to include the uranium claim in the September 2002 Dossier
- What the Hutton Report tells us
- The UK Government response to the IAEA Report to the Security Council
- The ISC investigations into the IAEA conclusion that the allegations were unfounded
-The revelations of Joseph Wilson and the retraction of the claim made by President George W. Bush in the 28 January 2003 State of the Union Address
APPENDIX 1
Correspondence between Lynne Jones and the Prime Minister (hard copy only)
APPENDIX 2
Correspondence between Llew Smith MP and the Prime Minister (hard copy only)
PRESS ARTICLES ANNEX Produced separately as an electronic document
Introduction
On 24 September 2002 Tony Blair made the following statement to Parliament:
…, we know that Saddam has been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa, though we do not know whether he has been successful.[1]
On 7 March 2003 the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Dr. El-Baradei, announced to the UN Security Council that the documents used to allege that Iraq had tried to conclude a contract with the African state of Niger to import raw uranium were ‘not authentic’ and that the allegations were ‘unfounded’[2].
The UK Government continues to stand by the claim, which was also in its 24 September 2002 Dossier,[3] that Iraq sought to procure significant quantities of uranium from Africa, stating that they have evidence from ‘the intelligence service of another Government’[4] for their claim that is unaffected by the forged intelligence revealed by the IAEA. On 30 January 2004, Jack Straw, revealed[5] that it was the UK Government’s understanding that the intelligence upon which the UK relied was discussed by the originators with the IAEA before the Agency concluded the allegations were unfounded. On 25 May 2004, Mark Gwozdecky, Spokesperson and Director Division of Public Information of the IAEA stated:
...we have received information from a number of member states regarding the allegation that Iraq sought to acquire uranium from Niger. However, we have learned nothing which would cause us to change the conclusion we reported to the United Nations Security Council on March 7, 2003 with regards to the documents assessed to be forgeries and have not received any information that would appear to be based on anything other than those documents.[6]
The information available to us causes us to have grave doubts about the veracity of the UK Government claim. In this submission, we have posed four questions, listed below. We hope that the Butler Review will address these, particularly as the Government is refusing to answer our Parliamentary Questions, referring us instead to the Butler Review.
September 2002 - Was it reasonable to include the ‘uranium from Africa’ claim in the UK Government dossier?
March 2003 - Was it reasonable for the UK to continue to stand by the claim after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed the forged evidence and stated the allegations were unfounded?
July 2003 - Was it reasonable for the UK to continue to stand by the claim after Joseph Wilson revealed the findings of his in-country investigation on behalf of the CIA and after the US Administration retracted the claim from the President’s State of the Union Address?
May 2004 – Parliamentary Questions, contradictions and inadequate answers. Is it reasonable for the UK to continue to stand by the claim in view of the current position of the IAEA and the failure of the Iraq Survey Group to back up the claim?
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[1] Official Report, 24 September 2002, Column 4
Summary - Conclusions and Recommendations
The UK Government confidence in their intelligence should not have prevented them from investigating the CIA reservations prior to the publication of the September 2002 Dossier. (paragraph 1.3)
The quote the Foreign Secretary gave of a CIA Intelligence Estimate to back up the UK position, appears simply to report, rather than "support" the UK view. Even after the Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman pointed this out, the claim of CIA “support” was reiterated in the Government’s official Response to the FAC Report, without providing the CIA quotation in question. The Butler Committee should report on whether the Foreign Secretary mislead the FAC in giving these responses. (paragraph 1.5)
The Intelligence and Security Committee’s own conclusion, that it was reasonable to include the uranium claim in the September 2002 Dossier, is questionable as their report inaccurately states that nothing had challenged the accuracy of the UK Secret Intelligence Service reports despite the ISC’s knowledge that the CIA had raised concerns prior to the publication of the claim. (paragraph 1.8)
We recommend that the Butler Committee establish whether John Scarlett, Head of the Joint Intelligence Committee, took the draft dossier to the US as instructed/expected by Alastair Campbell in his memorandum of 9 September 2002; and whether an explanation of the CIA reservations was obtained. (paragraph 1.10)
We recommend that the Butler Committee seek an explanation from John Scarlett for his comment that the evidence upon which the UK relied was “brokered with some difficulty with the originators” and investigate whether the uranium claim was something the intelligence services were looking for to help fit the case the Government wished to make, leading to an approach to evidence-gathering and verification that lacked objectivity or whether it was information that presented itself as part of the intelligence services’ normal investigations. (paragraph 1.14)
From the information made publicly available by the UK Government, the IAEA and the FAC, it is our view that the ISC investigation into this matter was insufficiently inquisitive – the ISC do not make it clear whether they even saw the relevant primary documentation. We recommend that the Butler Committee ask the Government for all relevant primary documentation on the claim, including the forged documents mentioned by the IAEA and assess what impact the forged evidence had on the UK sources of June 2002 (which is officially still ‘under consideration’ over a year after the forged evidence was revealed) and of September 2002 (the single source upon which the UK relied). (paragraph 2.20)
We recommend that the Butler Committee investigate whether the information the Government have made publicly available provides an accurate reflection of the primary evidence. (paragraph 2.21)
We note that after the US retraction prompted by Ambassador Wilson’s revelations, the UK Government suggested in its official Response to the FAC Report, that Wilson’s in-country investigation supported the UK Position. We recommend that the Butler Committee establishes whether this is the case. (paragraph 3.29)
We recommend that the Committee consider why the US are no longer prepared to rely on the UK insistence that the claim is correct and prepared to suffer the embarrassment of the 8 July 2003 retraction from the President’s January 2003 State of the Union Address? (paragraph 3.37)
We recommend that the Butler Committee establish between what dates the September 2002 source (upon which the UK Government relied), indicated the attempted procurement of uranium from Africa took place and assess whether the UK intelligence source of September 2002 refutes the findings of Ambassador Wilson’s in-country investigation of February 2002 that: “There was never any evidence of Iraqi uranium purchases from Niger” or the 7 March 2003 and 25 May 2004 conclusions of the IAEA that the allegations were unfounded. (paragraph 3.38)
We recommend that the Butler Committee ask the UK intelligence services for details of all recorded communications with their US counterparts which refer to the uranium allegations and consider Ambassador Wilson’s assertion that reports that the story of the alleged procurement could not be true had already “widely circulated in the American intelligence community” by the time he made his visit and, this being the case, whether it is credible that these reports would not have reached the UK intelligence community. (paragraph 3.39)
We recommend that the Butler Committee ask Ministers for an explanation for the discrepancy between the Parliamentary answer in March 2003 that stated that the Government had confidence in a ‘variety of sources’ and the subsequent revelation by the Intelligence and Security Committee that the Government had only two sources, one of which was ‘under consideration’ in the light of the knowledge of forgery of documents. (paragraph 4.44)
We recommend that the Butler Committee investigates the contradiction between the statement the Prime Minister and other Ministers made, that the UK claim was based on a foreign intelligence source and the statement made by Alastair Campbell that “the British intelligence put what they put in that dossier on the basis of British intelligence”. (paragraph 4.45)
We recommend that the Butler Committee look at all Parliamentary Questions the UK Government have answered by reference to the Butler Review and investigate the issues raised. (paragraph 4.46)
If, as Jack Straw indicates, the originators of the intelligence upon which the UK Government based its claim did discuss their intelligence with the IAEA before 7 March 2003, the evidence upon which the UK Government relied did not cause the IAEA to change their conclusion that these allegations were unfounded. (paragraph 4.50)
We recommend that the Butler Committee invite the IAEA to make available to them all the information they have received on the uranium claim. (paragraph 4.51)
In light of Jack Straw’s statement in a Parliamentary answer, that the UK Government understands the intelligence upon which they relied was discussed with the IAEA before the Agency reported the fake intelligence in March 2003, we recommend that the Butler Committee compares any information supplied by the IAEA with the primary intelligence source upon which the UK relied, ask whether it is reasonable for the UK to continue to stand by the claim and considers whether amendments should have been made to the assessment in the 24 September 2002 Dossier. (paragraph 4.52)
1. September 2002 - was it reasonable to include the ‘uranium from Africa’ claim in the UK Government dossier?
The Foreign Affairs Select Committee (FAC) questioning on the CIA’s reservations
1.1. The FAC conclusion in their July 2003 Report[7] that the claims made in the Government’s September Dossier were “in all probability well founded on the basis of the intelligence available” is illogical in view of their questions asking why the Government didn’t act in response to the CIA’s reservations. In their official Response to the FAC Report of November 2003 the Government state that they were not informed by the CIA of the forged documents.[8] However, in their report of September 2003[9]the Intelligence and Security Committee, tell us that, on 11 September 2002, prior to the publication of the 24 September 2002 Dossier, the CIA ‘made comments’ about the uranium claim (which the Government confirmed were ‘concerns’ in a written answer to Lynne Jones[10]) but the Foreign Secretary has stated that the CIA concerns were ‘unsupported by explanation’:
the US comment was unsupported by explanation and UK officials were confident that the dossier’s statement was based on reliable intelligence which we had not shared with the US (for good reasons, which I have given your Committee in private session). A judgement was therefore made to retain it.[11]
1.2. The FAC asked if any British official asked for an explanation[12]. The Foreign Secretary did not answer this question directly but responded by saying that a CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessment supported the UK view[13]. The Chair of the FAC subsequently pointed out that the quote given by Jack Straw of the NIE on Iraq's WMD, appears simply to report, rather than "support", the UK view[14]. Despite this, in their Response to the FAC Report, the Government repeated the claim that the CIA “supported” their view and, in this instance, did not provide the quotation in question.[15]
1.3. The UK Government confidence in their intelligence should not have prevented them from investigating the CIA reservations prior to the publication of the September 2002 Dossier.
1.4. The idea that the UK intelligence services would not have been aware of the CIA’s reservations via their normal working practices was challenged by Andrew Wilkie, formerly a Senior Intelligence Analyst at the Australian Office of National Assessments. In his oral evidence to the FAC on 19 June 2003, Mr Wilkie stated:
my understanding from having worked in the intelligence community is that the fact that the CIA disputed the uranium from Niger, that was known in the CIA early in 2002 and was shared with allied intelligence agencies through the normal intelligence sharing processes. As far as I am concerned the fact that that uranium claim was false would have been known by the British intelligence services months before this document [the September 2002 dossier] went to press.[16]
1.5. The quote the Foreign Secretary gave of a CIA Intelligence Estimate to back up the UK position, appears simply to report, rather than "support" the UK view. Even after the Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman pointed this out, the claim of CIA “support” was reiterated in the Government’s official Response to the FAC Report, without providing the CIA quotation in question. The Butler Committee should report on whether the Foreign Secretary misled the FAC in giving these responses.
The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) conclusion that it was reasonable to include the uranium claim in the September 2002 Dossier
1.6. In response to the FAC questions about the comments made by the CIA before the publication of the September 2002 Dossier, the Government refers to the conclusion in the ISC Report of 9 September 2003 on this issue:
We have questioned the SIS [Secret Intelligence Service] about the basis of its judgement and conclude that it is reasonable.[17]
1.7. However, despite reporting that the CIA had made comments prior to the publication of the Dossier, the ISC did not raise the outstanding questions from the FAC about the CIA reservations but stated, inaccurately, that:
At the time of producing the dossier, nothing had challenged the accuracy of the SIS reports[18]
1.8. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s own conclusion, that it was reasonable to include the uranium claim in the September 2002 Dossier, is questionable as their report inaccurately states that nothing had challenged the accuracy of the UK Secret Intelligence Service reports despite the ISC’s knowledge that the CIA had raised concerns prior to the publication of the claim.
What the Hutton Report tells us
1.9. The investigative discovery process of the Hutton Inquiry revealed the content of two drafts of the September 2002 Dossier and gave valuable insight into the drafting method[19]. However the veracity of the ‘uranium’ claim was not central to Lord Hutton’s conclusions on Dr Kelly’s Death. The Hutton Report gives us an indication, from a memorandum of 9 September 2002, that Alastair Campbell, Director of Communications at 10 Downing Street, instructed/expected John Scarlett, Head of the Joint Intelligence Committee, to take the draft dossier with him to the US:
“You will also take this to the US on your visit at the end of the week”[20].
1.10. We recommend that the Butler Committee establish whether John Scarlett, Head of the Joint Intelligence Committee, took the draft dossier to the US as instructed/expected by Alastair Campbell in his memorandum of 9 September 2002; and whether an explanation of the CIA reservations was obtained.
1.11. The Hutton Report referred to the claim that Iraq sought to procure uranium from Africa in Paragraph Chapter 6 which details in Paragraph 212 that on 17 September Alastair Campbell sent the following minute to John Scarlett:
3. Can we say he has secured uranium from Africa.
1.12. The response from Mr Scarlett was:
3. on the uranium from Africa, the agreed interpretation of the intelligence, brokered with some difficulty with the originators and owners of the reporting allows us only to say that he has 'sought' uranium from Africa.
1.13. The phrase “brokered with some difficulty with the originators” and the fact that the statements in the draft were changed from ‘procured’ to ‘sought’ uranium, raises concerns that the Government was not objective in its approach to evidence-gathering and verification and was determined to include intelligence in the Dossier which would give teeth to the idea that Saddam Hussein had an active nuclear weapons programme.
1.14. We recommend that the Butler Committee seek an explanation from John Scarlett for his comment that the evidence upon which the UK relied was “brokered with some difficulty with the originators” and investigate whether the uranium claim was something the intelligence services were looking for to help fit the case the Government wished to make, leading to an approach to evidence-gathering and verification that lacked objectivity or whether it was information that presented itself as part of the intelligence services’ normal investigations.
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[8] CM 6062, November 2003, Government's response to the Ninth report from the Foreign Affairs Committee on The Decision to go to War in Iraq
[11] Letter from Jack Straw to the Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman, Donald Anderson MP dated 11 July 2003
2. March 2003 - was it reasonable for the UK to continue to stand by the claim after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed forged evidence and stated the allegations were unfounded?
The UK Government response to the IAEA Report to the Security Council
2.15. After the Director General of the IAEA, Dr. El-Baradei, announced on 7 March 2003 to the UN Security Council that the documents used to make the uranium claim were forged and that the allegations were ‘unfounded’, in a written answer to Paul Flynn MP[21],Tony Blair stated on 19 March 2003 that the September 2002 dossier was still an accurate reflection of his assessment of Iraq’s proscribed weapons and that he had no plans to publish an amended version. The war was started a day later on 20 March and the findings of Dr El-Baradei were reiterated, on the Today Programme by Hans Blix:
and you have the even more flagrant case of the contract which was alleged that Iraq had concluded with Niger, or tried to conclude about the importation of raw uranium as a yellow cake and the IAEA found this was a fake.
The ISC investigations into the IAEA conclusion that the allegations were unfounded
2.16. The ISC Report of September 2003 leaves unanswered questions regarding the relationship between the forged evidence revealed by the IAEA and the UK intelligence. The ISC revealed that the UK had intelligence from two independent sources, one that reported in June 2002 and the other in September 2002 and that one of these was documentary. Whether the UK’s documentary source was authentic, was not concluded. Paragraph 92 of the report states:
The SIS told us that its source was still conducting further investigations into this matter.
2.17. Previously, in written evidence to the FAC[22], the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) had also said the forgeries passed to them were ‘under consideration’. In its report the FAC concluded that:
We conclude that it is very odd indeed that the Government asserts that it was not relying on the evidence which has since been shown to have been forged, but that eight months later it is still reviewing the other evidence.[23]
When, over 10 months later, Lynne Jones asked whether the Government had established the origin and history of these documents, the answer referred to the work of the Butler Review.
2.18. In a Parliamentary answer to Lynne Jones, the Government stated that the second source, upon which they relied, reported in September 2002 and that this was not affected by the IAEA forgeries[24], thus implying that it was not the documentary source (which was still ‘under consideration’). Lynne Jones asked what form the September 2002 source took and the Foreign Secretary said that it would not be appropriate to comment on the detail of this intelligence reporting and referred to the work of the Butler Review.[25] However, this was not a request for detail of the intelligence but a request for equivalent information about the form of the second source in view of the Government description of the form of the first. These questions were not raised by the ISC.
2.19. Furthermore, the ISC Report does not make it clear whether the Committee had sight of all the primary documentation relevant to the claim. In the section of the ISC Report detailing the written evidence received, they state that they received from the Government, ‘additional written information’ on ‘The background intelligence on the Iraqi intent to acquire uranium from Africa’[26]. Lynne Jones asked the Government whether the ISC requested and saw the primary sources upon which the Government based its claim and of the forged evidence given to the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) by the IAEA. The Government’s response was that they had nothing to add to the ISC Report[27]. On 26 May 2004, Lynne Jones wrote to the Ann Taylor MP, Chair of the ISC, to inform the Committee of the Question and the Government’s response and to ask if the Committee was prepared to give a response. The reply states that, after discussion, the Committee’s position remains as set out in their report and that they are ‘unable to add anything further’.[28]
2.20. From the information made publicly available by the UK Government, the IAEA and the FAC, it is our view that the ISC investigation into this matter was insufficiently inquisitive – the ISC do not make it clear whether they even saw the relevant primary documentation. We recommend that the Butler Committee ask the Government for all relevant primary documentation on the claim, including the forged documents mentioned by the IAEA and assess what impact the forged evidence had on the UK sources of June 2002 (which is officially still ‘under consideration’ over a year after the forged evidence was revealed) and of September 2002 (the single source upon which the UK relied).
2.21. We recommend that the Butler Committee investigate whether the information the Government have made publicly available provides an accurate reflection of the primary evidence.
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[22] FAC Ninth Report Ev 74, HC 813-II, Session 02/03
3. July 2003 - was it reasonable for the UK to continue to stand by the claim after Joseph Wilson revealed the findings of his in-country investigation on behalf of the CIA and after the US Administration retracted the claim from the President’s State of the Union Address?
The revelations of Joseph Wilson and the retraction of the claim made by US President, George W. Bush in the 28 January 2003 State of the Union Address
3.22. Joseph Wilson states his credentials for being sent to Niger on behalf of the CIA to investigate the uranium claim in his book, ‘The Politics of Truth,’ published in the spring of 2004:
“In short, I knew the country, its uranium industry and its leadership – intimately.” (p. 13).
3.23. Vice-President Cheney’s office requested that the CIA determine whether there was any truth in a report purporting to be a memorandum of sale of uranium from Niger to Iraq. Ambassador Wilson’s first meeting with Agency officials and experts from the State Department took place in February 2002, at the CIA’s Langley headquarters.
3.24. We question why neither this original report he was charged to investigate, nor reports made up from Ambassador Wilson’s oral de-brief by the CIA on his return and other reports from the US ambassador in Niger, Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick, and any internal CIA reports of his visit, were made available to him.
3.25. It emerged from Wilson’s discussions with the US Ambassador to Niger, that Marine General Carleton Fulford – the deputy commander-in-chief of US forces in Europe, who had accompanied the Ambassador to see Niger’s President Tandja over the uranium export claims – concurred with Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick that the story of the alleged sales could not be true (page 21). Reports of their views had already “widely circulated in the American intelligence community” by the time Wilson made his visit. This being the case, is it credible that these reports would not have reached the UK intelligence community?
3.26. Wilson knew Niger well. He had been Ambassador to neighbouring Gabon from 1992-1995 (and which was also a uranium-producing country). He used his contacts with former officials, European expatriates, Nigerian businessmen and international aid workers (page 23) to discover the situation in the uranium industry. Wilson relates how it would have been well neigh impossible for any clandestine deal for uranium exports to be done, as the uranium mine operators, the French company COGEMA (plus German, Japanese and Spanish companies, its partners in the mine ventures), the Niger Foreign and Trade ministries would all have had to be in on such a deal. He found no evidence of any such conspiracy. As Wilson put it:
“The system did not lend itself to circumvention.”
3.27. In the chapter, ‘What I didn’t find in Africa,’ (pages 325-341) Wilson sets out how the politicization of the claims over alleged Niger uranium exports to Iraq came about and was played out in the increasingly febrile atmosphere in the build up to invading Iraq and its post-war aftermath. He points out that US National Security Advisor Dr Condoleezza Rice argued in the post invasion period that the “uranium charge” was really just a small part of the nuclear weapons program indictment. He describes this argument as “another lie,” going on to argue that “had the charge been true, it would have really been the smoking gun to prove that Saddam had broken out of the box of containment into which the international community had effectively put him in 1991.” That is why, he asserts, it was “absolutely vital” to determine the accuracy of the allegation.
3.28. His bold, but unequivocal conclusion is:
“There was never any evidence of Iraqi uranium purchases from Niger.”
3.29. Ambassador Wilson relates that after the publication of his New York Times commentary piece on 6 July[29], he was invited to discuss its contents and implications on several television political talk shows. He records that twenty four hours later, the White House acknowledged that the 16 words on uranium in President Bush’s January 2003 State of the Union speech “did not rise to the level that we would [expect to be] put in a presidential speech.” and it was retracted as inaccurate.[30] We note that after the US retraction prompted by Ambassador Wilson’s revelations, the UK Government suggested in its official Response to the FAC Report, that Wilson’s in-country investigation supported the UK Position[31]. We recommend that the Butler Committee establishes whether this is the case.
3.30. On 8 July 2003, the same day as the US retraction, Tony Blair stood by the claim and told the House of Commons Liaison Committee that:
"The evidence that we had that the Iraqi Government had gone back to try to purchase further amounts of uranium from Niger did not come from these so-called "forged" documents, they came from separate intelligence."
3.31. On 14 July 2003, Lynne Jones asked if the UK had formally told the IAEA it did not concur with their conclusion on the allegations in the wake of the US rejection of the claims. The Government replied:
Mr. Rammell: No. We have, however, made a number of public statements to the effect that we believe that there is good evidence to support our assertion that Iraq tried to procure uranium.[32]
3.32. But clearly this was insufficient for the White House by this point in time. On the US retraction, Ambassador Wilson adds that when the [Bush] Administration officials finally did tell the truth, they quickly regretted it and began to backtrack. One official is said by Wilson to have told Walter Pincus, the Washington Post’s national security and intelligence reporter that telling the truth was “the biggest mistake the administration had made.”(Page 335) From then on Wilson claimed the Administration downplayed the importance of the Niger uranium claim, and worked to blacken his own reputation. He suggests that “it seemed the motive for the attacks on me was to discourage anyone else from coming forward who had a critical story to tell.” (Page 338)
3.33. It is not our purpose in this submission to analyse the politics of Capitol Hill and the US administration. However, the findings of the Wilson in-country investigation back up the 7 March 2003 conclusion of the IAEA. The resulting White House statement that they regarded the UK report to be inaccurate shows how the UK became isolated in standing by the claim. The reports of attempts to brief against Joseph Wilson show the political importance of the claim and give some possible insight into why the UK have stood by it in the face of the evidence against it.
3.34. Wilson himself states:
“The decision of the President’s people to come after me and make me an example arose from no concern over the emergence of secrets related to my mission – there weren’t any – but rather from the worry that the pressure they had placed upon intelligence analysts, in order to manipulate data to conform to their already determined political ends, would be exposed...when the warmongers discovered they could not brow-beat the analysts, such as in the Niger uranium claim, they simply found a way around the objections of the intelligence community by attributing the allegation to the British whitepaper.”
3.35. Importantly he added:
“Everybody in the intelligence-analysis world knew that the British claim was based on the same suspect reporting that our intelligence had rejected, but no matter.”(page 339)
3.36. Lynne Jones asked the Foreign Secretary a Parliamentary Question to try and establish whether the attempted procurement alleged by the UK took place before or after Joseph Wilson’s visit in February 2002. The Government’s response was to refer to the work of the Butler Review.[33]
3.37. We recommend that the Committee consider why the US are no longer prepared to rely on the UK insistence that the claim is correct and prepared to suffer the embarrassment of the 8 July 2003 retraction from the President’s January 2003 State of the Union Address?
3.38. We recommend that the Butler Committee establish between what dates the September 2002 source (upon which the UK Government relied), indicated the attempted procurement of uranium from Africa took place and assess whether the UK intelligence source of September 2002 refutes the findings of Ambassador Wilson’s in-country investigation of February 2002 that: “There was never any evidence of Iraqi uranium purchases from Niger” or the 7 March 2003 and 25 May 2004 conclusions of the IAEA that the allegations were unfounded.
3.39. We recommend that the Butler Committee ask the UK intelligence services for details of all recorded communications with their US counterparts which refer to the uranium allegations and consider Ambassador Wilson’s assertion that reports that the story of the alleged procurement could not be true had already “widely circulated in the American intelligence community” by the time he made his visit and, this being the case, whether it is credible that these reports would not have reached the UK intelligence community.
4. May 2004 – Parliamentary Questions, contradictions and inadequate answers. Is it reasonable for the UK to continue to stand by the claim in view of the current position of the IAEA and the failure of the Iraq Survey Group to back up the claim?
4.40. On 31 March 2003, Mike O’Brien MP, Under Secretary of State at the FCO answered a Parliamentary Question from Chris Mullin MP (now himself a Foreign Office Minister) stating that the UK Government continued to have confidence that the ‘uranium claim’ was backed up by a ‘variety of sources’.[34] This is contradicted by the ISC Report which tells us that the Government only had two sources, one of which was under consideration in the light of the knowledge of forgery of documents.
4.41. On 1 September an answer by Bill Rammell MP, Under Secretary of State at the FCO, stated that the intelligence upon which the UK Government relied came from ‘the intelligence service of another Government’[35]. In correspondence with Lynne Jones MP (attached as Appendix 1) in a letter dated 23 September 2003, the Prime Minister also reiterated that the intelligence did not come from the UK but from another country. This contradicted remarks of 27 June 2003 by Alistair Campbell, then Director of Communications for 10 Downing Street and responsible to the Prime Minister, who said on Channel 4 News:
“the British intelligence put what they put in that dossier on the basis of British intelligence. Get your facts right before you make serious allegations against a government.”[36]
4.42. In correspondence with the Prime Minister, Lynne Jones has requested clarification on this point but clarification has not been provided.
4.43. Lynne Jones wrote to Jack Straw on 27 May 2004 to complain that the Government were not answering Parliamentary Questions on the ‘uranium claim’[37] but instead simply referring to the Butler Review, thereby replacing Parliamentary accountability with a secret inquiry on these matters (reply still outstanding at time of writing).
4.44. We recommend that the Butler Committee ask Ministers for an explanation for the discrepancy between the Parliamentary answer in March 2003 that stated that the Government had confidence in a ‘variety of sources’ and the subsequent revelation by the Intelligence and Security Committee that the Government had only two sources, one of which was ‘under consideration’ in the light of the knowledge of forgery of documents.
4.45. We recommend that the Butler Committee investigates the contradiction between the statement the Prime Minister and other Ministers made, that the UK claim was based on a foreign intelligence source and the statement made by Alastair Campbell that “the British intelligence put what they put in that dossier on the basis of British intelligence”.
4.46. We recommend that the Butler Committee look at all Parliamentary Questions the UK Government have answered by reference to the Butler Review and investigate the issues raised.
4.47. In a letter to Lynne Jones MP dated 23 September 2003, the Prime Minister suggested that the UK Government did not consider the IAEA to be in possession of the intelligence available to the UK:
We have, of course, encouraged all states that have relevant information to pass it to the IAEA in accordance with the provisions of Article 10 of UN Security Council Resolution 1441, and it is disappointing that there remains evidence that has not been made available to them.
4.48. On 30 January 2004, however, this was subsequently contradicted by Jack Straw, when he revealed[38] that it was the UK Government’s understanding that the intelligence upon which the UK relied was discussed by the originators with the IAEA before the Agency concluded the allegations were unfounded. Lynne Jones contacted the IAEA on 19 May 2004 to ask whether a ‘third party’ discussed or showed evidence with the IAEA and what assessment the IAEA made of any such discussion/evidence. On 25 May 2004, Mark Gwozdecky, Spokesperson and Director Division of Public Information (MTPI) of the IAEA responded as follows:
I can confirm to you that we have received information from a number of member states regarding the allegation that Iraq sought to acquire uranium from Niger. However, we have learned nothing which would cause us to change the conclusion we reported to the United Nations Security Council on March 7, 2003 with regards to the documents assessed to be forgeries and have not received any information that would appear to be based on anything other than those documents.
4.49. We recommend that the Butler Committee invite the IAEA to make available to them all the information they have received on the uranium claim.
4.50. On 7 June 2004, Lynne Jones tabled a parliamentary question asking what the basis is for the Foreign Secretary’s understanding that the intelligence upon which the UK Government based its claim was discussed by the originators with the IAEA. The Government’s response was that they were withholding details of intelligence exchanges with allies under Exemption 1 (c) of Part 2 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.[39] If, as Jack Straw indicates, the originators of the intelligence upon which the UK Government based its claim did discuss their intelligence with the IAEA before 7 March 2003, the evidence upon which the UK Government relied did not cause the IAEA to change their conclusion that these allegations were unfounded.
4.51. The Iraq Survey Group has not been able to verify the UK Government’s claim. On the contrary, in the January 26 2004 edition of the New York Times, Dr. David Kay, who resigned as head of the ISG said his team had uncovered no evidence that Niger had tried to sell uranium to Iraq for a nuclear weapons program (see press Annex, page 91).
4.52. In light of Jack Straw’s statement in a Parliamentary answer, that the UK Government understands the intelligence upon which they relied was discussed with the IAEA before the Agency reported the fake intelligence in March 2003, we recommend that the Butler Committee compares any information supplied by the IAEA with the primary intelligence source upon which the UK relied, ask whether it is reasonable for the UK to continue to stand by the claim and considers whether amendments should have been made to the assessment in the 24 September 2002 Dossier.
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[37] Official Report: 26 May 2004 : Column 1638-1639W, 19 May 2004 : Column 1085W, 6 May 2004 : Column 1733- 1734W (PQs 170513, 171718, 173387, 175478, 175493, 175494)
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
IAEA – Internatinonal Atomic Energy Authority
ISC – Intelligence and Security Committee
ISG – Iraq Survey Group
FCO - Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FAC – Foreign Affairs Select Committee (House of Commons)
NIE – National Intelligence Estimate (CIA)
SIS – Secret Intelligence Service
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction
ENDNOTES
1. 7 March 2003 | New York, USA
Statement to the United Nations Security Council the Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed El Baradei
Uranium Acquisition
The IAEA has made progress in its investigation into reports that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger in recent years. The investigation was centred on documents provided by a number of States that pointed to an agreement between Niger and Iraq for the sale of uranium between 1999 and 2001.
The IAEA has discussed these reports with the Governments of Iraq and Niger, both of which have denied that any such activity took place. For its part, Iraq has provided the IAEA with a comprehensive explanation of its relations with Niger, and has described a visit by an Iraqi official to a number of African countries, including Niger, in February 1999, which Iraq thought might have given rise to the reports. The IAEA was also able to review correspondence coming from various bodies of the Government of Niger, and to compare the form, format, contents and signatures of that correspondence with those of the alleged procurement-related documentation.
Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents - which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger - are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded. However, we will continue to follow up any additional evidence, if it emerges, relevant to efforts by Iraq to illicitly import nuclear materials.
2. Foreign Affairs Committee News Release 30 July 2003 PN 40 Session 02/03
On 15 July 2003 Donald Anderson, wrote to the Foreign Secretary and asked:
On receipt of the CIA’s reservations, which you say in your letter were ‘unsupported by explanations’, about the uranium from Africa element in the September 2002 dossier, did any British official ask for an explanation of the CIA’s reservations? If not, why not? If so, what was the CIA’s response?
The Foreign Secretary’s response was:
UK intelligence officials have regular exchanges with their counterparts in the CIA. We note that the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessment, parts of which were published on 18 July 2003, supports our view that Iraq had sought to acquire yellowcake from Africa. The relevant part of the NIE reads:
'A foreign government service reported that as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of 'pure uranium' (probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early 2001 Niger and Iraq reportedly were still working out arrangements for this deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake. We do not know the status of the arrangement.'
3. HC 81 Second Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee Session 03/04 Ev 60-61
[Donald Anderson in a letter to the Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 29 October 2003]
I am disappointed that you feel unable to supply further information on the CIA's reservations on the uranium from Africa claim. The extract from the NIE on Iraq's WMD, quoted in your original response of 29 July, appears simply to report, rather than—as you suggest—to "support", the UK view that Iraq had sought to procure yellowcake from Niger. I believe that this interpretation was confirmed by George Tenet on 11 July, when he stated that:
"Portions of the State of the Union speech draft came to the CIA for comment shortly before the speech was given. Various parts were shared with cognizant elements of the Agency for review. Although the documents related to the alleged Niger-Iraqi uranium deal had not yet been determined to be forgeries, officials who were reviewing the draft remarks on uranium raised several concerns about the fragmentary nature of the intelligence with National Security Council colleagues. Some of the language was changed. From what we know now, Agency officials in the end concurred that the text in the speech was factually correct—ie that the British government report said that Iraq sought uranium from Africa. This should not have been the test for clearing a Presidential address. This did not rise to the level of certainty which should be required for Presidential speeches, and CIA should have ensured that it was removed."
Also in his statement of 11 July, George Tenet said:
"in the fall of 2002, our British colleagues told us they were planning to publish an unclassified dossier that mentioned reports of Iraqi attempts to obtain uranium in Africa. Because we viewed the reporting on such acquisition attempts to be inconclusive, we expressed reservations about its inclusion but our colleagues said they were confident in their reports and left it in their document."
4. CM 6062, Government Response to HC 813-I House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The Decision to go to War in Iraq, Ninth Report of Session 2003-03
8. The assertion “... that Iraq sought the supply of significant amounts of uranium from Africa ...“ should have been qualified to reflect the uncertainty. We recommend that the Government explain on what evidence it relied for its judgement in September 2002 that Iraq had recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. We further recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set out whether it still considers the September dossier to be accurate in what it states about Iraq’s attempts to procure uranium from Africa, in the light of subsequent events. (paragraph 60)
Government Response:
We believe the claims made in the Dossier that Iraq had sought to obtain yellow cake from Africa were reliable. The Dossier statement was based on reliable intelligence that we had not shared with the US for reasons that have been explained to the FAC in private session. In addition we have pointed out to the Committee that in October 2002 a US National Intelligence Estimate was drawn up supporting our view that Iraq had sought to acquire yellow cake from Africa. We have also explained to the Committee that the report of US Ambassador Wilson noted that in 1999 an Iraqi delegation sought the expansion of trade links with Niger — and that former Niger government officials believed that this was in connection with the procurement of yellow cake.
5. 10/11 September – draft version of the 24 September 2002 Dossier - Hutton Report (Appendix 9)
The Hutton Report reproduces the 10/11 September draft version of the dossier which twice states that Iraq had purchased uranium (specifying from Africa only once) and once states that Iraq had sought the supply of uranium from Africa.[1]
16 September – draft version of the 24 September 2002 Dossier - Hutton Report (Appendix 10)
The Hutton Report also reproduces the draft dossier of 16 September which removes all statements that Iraq had purchased uranium (specifying from Africa only once) but three times states that Iraq had sought uranium from Africa.
6. Official Report 19 Mar 2003 : Column 785W
Paul Flynn: To ask the Prime Minister what plans he has to publish amendments to his assessment in the document 'Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction' presented to the House in September 2002 arising from the evidence of UNMOVIC inspectors on Iraqi (a) bases, (b) presidential palaces and (c) uranium imports. [102883]
The Prime Minister: I have no plans to publish an amended version of the dossier presented in September 2002, the contents of which still accurately reflect our assessment of the position with regard to Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes.
7. New York Times, 6 July 2003
What I Didn't Find in Africa
By JOSEPH C. WILSON 4th
WASHINGTON
Did the Bush administration manipulate intelligence about Saddam Hussein's weapons programs to justify an invasion of Iraq? Based on my experience with the administration in the months leading up to the war, I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat.
For 23 years, from 1976 to 1998, I was a career foreign service officer and ambassador. In 1990, as chargé d'affaires in Baghdad, I was the last American diplomat to meet with Saddam Hussein. (I was also a forceful advocate for his removal from Kuwait.) After Iraq, I was President George H. W. Bush's ambassador to Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe; under President Bill Clinton, I helped direct Africa policy for the National Security Council.
It was my experience in Africa that led me to play a small role in the effort to verify information about Africa's suspected link to Iraq's nonconventional weapons programs. Those news stories about that unnamed former envoy who went to Niger? That's me.
In February 2002, I was informed by officials at the Central Intelligence Agency that Vice President Dick Cheney's office had questions about a particular intelligence report. While I never saw the report, I was told that it referred to a memorandum of agreement that documented the sale of uranium yellowcake - a form of lightly processed ore - by Niger to Iraq in the late 1990's. The agency officials asked if I would travel to Niger to check out the story so they could provide a response to the vice president's office.
After consulting with the State Department's African Affairs Bureau (and through it with Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick, the United States ambassador to Niger), I agreed to make the trip. The mission I undertook was discreet but by no means secret. While the C.I.A. paid my expenses (my time was offered pro bono), I made it abundantly clear to everyone I met that I was acting on behalf of the United States government. In late February 2002, I arrived in Niger's capital, Niamey, where I had been a diplomat in the mid-70's and visited as a National Security Council official in the late 90's. The city was much as I remembered it. Seasonal winds had clogged the air with dust and sand. Through the haze, I could see camel caravans crossing the Niger River (over the John F. Kennedy bridge), the setting sun behind them. Most people had wrapped scarves around their faces to protect against the grit, leaving only their eyes visible. The next morning, I met with Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick at the embassy. For reasons that are understandable, the embassy staff has always kept a close eye on Niger's uranium business. I was not surprised, then, when the ambassador told me that she knew about the allegations of uranium sales to Iraq - and that she felt she had already debunked them in her reports to Washington. Nevertheless, she and I agreed that my time would be best spent interviewing people who had been in government when the deal supposedly took place, which was before her arrival. I spent the next eight days drinking sweet mint tea and meeting with dozens of people: current government officials, former government officials, people associated with the country's uranium business. It did not take long to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any such transaction had ever taken place.
Given the structure of the consortiums that operated the mines, it would be exceedingly difficult for Niger to transfer uranium to Iraq. Niger's uranium business consists of two mines, Somair and Cominak, which are run by French, Spanish, Japanese, German and Nigerian interests. If the government wanted to remove uranium from a mine, it would have to notify the consortium, which in turn is strictly monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, because the two mines are closely regulated, quasi-governmental entities, selling uranium would require the approval of the minister of mines, the prime minister and probably the president. In short, there's simply too much oversight over too small an industry for a sale to have transpired. (As for the actual memorandum, I never saw it. But news accounts have pointed out that the documents had glaring errors - they were signed, for example, by officials who were no longer in government - and were probably forged. And then there's the fact that Niger formally denied the charges.) Before I left Niger, I briefed the ambassador on my findings, which were consistent with her own. I also shared my conclusions with members of her staff. In early March, I arrived in Washington and promptly provided a detailed briefing to the C.I.A. I later shared my conclusions with the State Department African Affairs Bureau. There was nothing secret or earth-shattering in my report, just as there was nothing secret about my trip. Though I did not file a written report, there should be at least four documents in United States government archives confirming my mission. The documents should include the ambassador's report of my debriefing in Niamey, a separate report written by the embassy staff, a C.I.A. report summing up my trip, and a specific answer from the agency to the office of the vice president (this may have been delivered orally). While I have not seen any of these reports, I have spent enough time in government to know that this is standard operating procedure. I thought the Niger matter was settled and went back to my life. (I did take part in the Iraq debate, arguing that a strict containment regime backed by the threat of force was preferable to an invasion.) In September 2002, however, Niger re-emerged. The British government published a "white paper" asserting that Saddam Hussein and his unconventional arms posed an immediate danger. As evidence, the report cited Iraq's attempts to purchase uranium from an African country.
Then, in January, President Bush, citing the British dossier, repeated the charges about Iraqi efforts to buy uranium from Africa.
The next day, I reminded a friend at the State Department of my trip and suggested that if the president had been referring to Niger, then his conclusion was not borne out by the facts as I understood them. He replied that perhaps the president was speaking about one of the other three African countries that produce uranium: Gabon, South Africa or Namibia. At the time, I accepted the explanation. I didn't know that in December, a month before the president's address, the State Department had published a fact sheet that mentioned the Niger case. Those are the facts surrounding my efforts. The vice president's office asked a serious question. I was asked to help formulate the answer. I did so, and I have every confidence that the answer I provided was circulated to the appropriate officials within our government.
The question now is how that answer was or was not used by our political leadership. If my information was deemed inaccurate, I understand (though I would be very interested to know why). If, however, the information was ignored because it did not fit certain preconceptions about Iraq, then a legitimate argument can be made that we went to war under false pretenses.. (It's worth remembering that in his March "Meet the Press" appearance, Mr.. Cheney said that Saddam Hussein was "trying once again to produce nuclear
weapons.") At a minimum, Congress, which authorized the use of military force at the president's behest, should want to know if the assertions about Iraq were warranted. I was convinced before the war that the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein required a vigorous and sustained international response to disarm him. Iraq possessed and had used chemical weapons; it had an active biological weapons program and quite possibly a nuclear research program - all of which were in violation of United Nations resolutions. Having encountered Mr. Hussein and his thugs in the run-up to the Persian Gulf war of 1991, I was only too aware of the dangers he posed. But were these dangers the same ones the administration told us about? We have to find out. America's foreign policy depends on the sanctity of its information. For this reason, questioning the selective use of intelligence to justify the war in Iraq is neither idle sniping nor "revisionist history," as Mr. Bush has suggested. The act of war is the last option of a democracy, taken when there is a grave threat to our national security. More than 200 American soldiers have lost their lives in Iraq already. We have a duty to ensure that their sacrifice came for the right reasons.
Joseph C. Wilson 4th, United States ambassador to Gabon from 1992 to 1995, is an international business consultant
8. White House website:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030707-5.html
On 8 July 2003The White House officially acknowledge that the Niger claim was wrong and suggested it should not have been used in the president's State of the Union speech in January 2003. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer:
"The president's statement was based on the predicate of the yellow cake [uranium] from Niger. So given the fact that the report on the yellow cake did not turn out to be accurate, that is reflective of the president's broader statement."
9. Official Report 31 Mar 2003 : Column 521W
Mr. Mullin: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what reports he has received about the source of evidence passed to the UN inspectors in Iraq in support of the allegation that Iraq had attempted to obtain uranium from Niger; and if he will make a statement. [105302]
Mr. Mike O'Brien: Information was passed to the UN weapons inspection teams from a number of sources. The documents referred to by Dr. El-Baradei in his presentation to the UN Security Council on 7 March 2003 came from only one of those sources. These were not documents provided by the UK. We continue to have confidence that the information provided by a variety of sources demonstrates a clear intention by Iraq to procure uranium to restart a covert nuclear programme.
10. Official Report 1 September 2003 : Column 810W
Lynne Jones: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs pursuant to his answer of 3 July 2003, Official Report, column 456W, on Iraq, if he will make a statement on the UK Government's obligations under Article 10 of Security Council Resolution 1441 to pass to the International Atomic Energy Agency the information upon which it bases its assessment that Saddam Hussein's regime attempted to obtain uranium from Africa.
Mr. Rammell: The UK has encouraged all states that have relevant information to pass it to the UN weapons inspection teams. The information upon which the assessment was made that Saddam Hussein's regime had attempted to procure uranium from Africa came from the intelligence service of another Government. Under the terms of long-established agreements covering the sharing of intelligence information, no Government can pass on such information to anyone else without the express consent of its originator
11. Official Report 30 Jan 2004 : Column 580W
Lynne Jones: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether the Government have asked the state from which they obtained intelligence on Iraq's alleged attempt to procure uranium from Africa if they may share that intelligence with (a) the United States Administration and (b) other governments. [151301]
Mr. Straw: The Government asked the originators of the intelligence that Iraq sought the supply of uranium from Africa to discuss the issue with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Government understand this was done shortly before the IAEA report of 7 March 2003. I am withholding further details of intelligence exchanges with allies under Exemption 1(c) of Part 2 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.
12. Extract on the Niger Uranium issue from the transcript of the interview with Downing Street's Director of Communications Alastair Campbell on Channel 4 News 27 June 2003.
Jon Snow: The issue in play here today is absolutely that this war was fought on the basis of intelligence information. That intelligence information firstly; the charge that in the first document in September there were serious errors of fact.
Alastair Campbell: Sorry the first document in September? There were serious errors of fact? And what were they Jon?
Jon Snow: The Niger allegation in which the Minister who was supposed to have signed the nuclear purchasing order had himself resigned many years before.
Alastair Campbell: You know do you Jon that that was the basis on which British intelligence put that in the dossier? You know that, do you? Because if you think that, you are wrong. There were no errors of fact in the WMD dossier in September 2002.
Jon Snow: The Niger source has nothing to do with us?
Alastair Campbell: It was another country's intelligence, and the British intelligence put what they put in that dossier on the basis of British intelligence. Get your facts right before you make serious allegations against a government.
For details of our response to the Butler Review's findings on the uranium claim click here.
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